Hit papers significantly outperform the citation benchmark for their cohort. A paper qualifies
if it has ≥500 total citations, achieves ≥1.5× the top-1% citation threshold for papers in the
same subfield and year (this is the minimum needed to enter the top 1%, not the average
within it), or reaches the top citation threshold in at least one of its specific research
topics.
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
19861.5k citationsKen Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein et al.profile →
This map shows the geographic impact of Ken Binmore's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Ken Binmore with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Ken Binmore more than expected).
This network shows the impact of papers produced by Ken Binmore. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Ken Binmore. The network helps show where Ken Binmore may publish in the future.
Co-authorship network of co-authors of Ken Binmore
This figure shows the co-authorship network connecting the top 25 collaborators of Ken Binmore.
A scholar is included among the top collaborators of Ken Binmore based on the total number of
citations received by their joint publications. Widths of edges
represent the number of papers authors have co-authored together.
Node borders
signify the number of papers an author published with Ken Binmore. Ken Binmore is excluded from
the visualization to improve readability, since they are connected to all nodes in the network.
All Works
20 of 20 papers shown
1.
Binmore, Ken, Joseph Swierzbinski, & Christopher Tomlinson. (2007). An Experimental Test of Rubinstein’s Bargaining Model. UCL Discovery (University College London).9 indexed citations
2.
Binmore, Ken. (2007). Playing for Real: A Text on Game Theory. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics.131 indexed citations
3.
Binmore, Ken. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics.23 indexed citations
4.
Binmore, Ken. (2007). Rational Decisions in Large Worlds.. Annals of Economics and Statistics. 25–41.5 indexed citations
Binmore, Ken. (2005). Why the Distinction Between Knowledge and Belief Might Matter. Econ journal watch. 2(1). 97–104.3 indexed citations
7.
Binmore, Ken. (2004). A review of Philip Mirowski's Machine Dreams. Journal of Economic Methodology. 11.2 indexed citations
8.
Binmore, Ken. (2001). How and why did fairness norms evolve?. UCL Discovery (University College London).6 indexed citations
9.
Binmore, Ken, et al.. (2001). Calculus: Concepts and Methods. London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science). 2(3489). 951–2.36 indexed citations
10.
Binmore, Ken & Larry Samuelson. (1999). Equilibrium selection and evolutionary drift. UCL Discovery (University College London).1 indexed citations
11.
Binmore, Ken & Nir Vulkan. (1999). Applying game theory to automated negotiation. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics.4 indexed citations
12.
Binmore, Ken. (1998). The Complexity of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod .. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation. 1.12 indexed citations
13.
Ben‐Ner, Avner, Avner Ben‐Ner, Amartya Sen, et al.. (1998). Economics, Values, and Organization. Cambridge University Press eBooks.182 indexed citations
14.
Binmore, Ken. (1997). Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II. UCL Discovery (University College London).1 indexed citations
15.
Binmore, Ken. (1994). Game theory and the social contract: volume 1: playing fair. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics.82 indexed citations
16.
Binmore, Ken, et al.. (1993). Frontiers of game theory. MIT Press eBooks.82 indexed citations
17.
Binmore, Ken. (1992). Fun and games : a text on game theory.376 indexed citations
18.
Binmore, Ken, Avner Shaked, & John R. Sutton. (1988). A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply. American Economic Review. 78(4). 837–839.4 indexed citations
19.
Binmore, Ken. (1988). SOCIAL CONTRACT II: GAUTHIER AND NASH.. Deep Blue (University of Michigan).4 indexed citations
20.
Roth, Alvin E., Alvin E. Roth, Alvin E. Roth, et al.. (1985). Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press eBooks.307 indexed citations breakdown →
Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive
bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global
research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include
incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and
delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in
Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.