Gila Sher

1.9k total citations
35 papers, 753 citations indexed

About

Gila Sher is a scholar working on Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science. According to data from OpenAlex, Gila Sher has authored 35 papers receiving a total of 753 indexed citations (citations by other indexed papers that have themselves been cited), including 19 papers in Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, 18 papers in Philosophy and 11 papers in History and Philosophy of Science. Recurrent topics in Gila Sher's work include Philosophy and Theoretical Science (19 papers), Classical Philosophy and Thought (10 papers) and Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 papers). Gila Sher is often cited by papers focused on Philosophy and Theoretical Science (19 papers), Classical Philosophy and Thought (10 papers) and Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (8 papers). Gila Sher collaborates with scholars based in United States, Dominican Republic and China. Gila Sher's co-authors include Stewart Shapiro, Kelly Becker, Tim Button, Igor Douven, Sanford C. Goldberg, Duncan Pritchard, Sven Bernecker, Thomas Grundmann, Gary Ebbs and Jesper Kallestrup and has published in prestigious journals such as The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy and Synthese.

In The Last Decade

Gila Sher

35 papers receiving 637 citations

Peers

Gila Sher
Stephen Read United Kingdom
Agustín Rayo United States
Gabriel Uzquiano United States
Francesco Berto Netherlands
Jc Beall United States
Volker Halbach United Kingdom
Jody Azzouni United States
Vann McGee United States
Bob Hale United Kingdom
Stephen Read United Kingdom
Gila Sher
Citations per year, relative to Gila Sher Gila Sher (= 1×) peers Stephen Read

Countries citing papers authored by Gila Sher

Since Specialization
Citations

This map shows the geographic impact of Gila Sher's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Gila Sher with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Gila Sher more than expected).

Fields of papers citing papers by Gila Sher

Since Specialization
Physical SciencesHealth SciencesLife SciencesSocial Sciences

This network shows the impact of papers produced by Gila Sher. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Gila Sher. The network helps show where Gila Sher may publish in the future.

Co-authorship network of co-authors of Gila Sher

This figure shows the co-authorship network connecting the top 25 collaborators of Gila Sher. A scholar is included among the top collaborators of Gila Sher based on the total number of citations received by their joint publications. Widths of edges represent the number of papers authors have co-authored together. Node borders signify the number of papers an author published with Gila Sher. Gila Sher is excluded from the visualization to improve readability, since they are connected to all nodes in the network.

All Works

20 of 20 papers shown
1.
Sher, Gila. (2023). Correspondence pluralism. Synthese. 202(5). 1 indexed citations
2.
Sher, Gila. (2022). The metaphysics of truth: anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. Inquiry. 66(8). 1494–1512. 1 indexed citations
3.
Sher, Gila. (2020). PLURALISM AND NORMATIVITY IN TRUTH AND LOGIC. American Philosophical Quarterly. 57(4). 337–354. 1 indexed citations
4.
Sher, Gila. (2019). Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97(3). 618–621. 4 indexed citations
5.
Sher, Gila. (2017). Truth and Scientific Change. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 48(3). 371–394. 3 indexed citations
6.
Sher, Gila. (2016). Epistemic Friction. Oxford University Press eBooks. 39 indexed citations
7.
Sher, Gila. (2016). Substantivism about truth. Philosophy Compass. 11(12). 818–828. 12 indexed citations
8.
Sher, Gila. (2016). Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation). 10 indexed citations
9.
Goldberg, Sanford C., Gary Ebbs, Jesper Kallestrup, et al.. (2015). The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press eBooks. 5 indexed citations
10.
Sher, Gila. (2010). Is logic in the mind or in the world?. Synthese. 181(2). 353–365. 6 indexed citations
11.
Sher, Gila. (2010). Quantifiers in Language and Logic. The Journal of Philosophy. 107(2). 103–112. 66 indexed citations
12.
Sher, Gila. (2009). Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic. Erkenntnis. 72(2). 151–176. 2 indexed citations
13.
Sher, Gila. (2008). A Characterization of Logical Constants Is Possible. THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science. 18(2). 189–198. 11 indexed citations
14.
Sher, Gila. (2004). In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy. 101(1). 5–36. 43 indexed citations
15.
Sher, Gila. (2002). Logical Consequence. The Monist. 85(4). 555–579. 3 indexed citations
16.
Sher, Gila. (2001). The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence. The Philosophical Review. 110(2). 241–241. 4 indexed citations
17.
Sher, Gila. (1999). Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine’s Theory?. The Journal of Philosophy. 96(10). 491–524. 13 indexed citations
18.
Sher, Gila. (1999). What is Tarski's Theory of Truth?. Topoi. 18(2). 149–166. 10 indexed citations
19.
Sher, Gila. (1999). Is logic a theory of the obvious. 4. 9 indexed citations
20.
Sher, Gila. (1990). Ways of branching quantifers. Linguistics and Philosophy. 13(4). 393–422. 21 indexed citations

Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.

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