Michael Strevens

2.4k total citations
50 papers, 1.2k citations indexed

About

Michael Strevens is a scholar working on History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy and Experimental and Cognitive Psychology. According to data from OpenAlex, Michael Strevens has authored 50 papers receiving a total of 1.2k indexed citations (citations by other indexed papers that have themselves been cited), including 30 papers in History and Philosophy of Science, 12 papers in Philosophy and 8 papers in Experimental and Cognitive Psychology. Recurrent topics in Michael Strevens's work include Philosophy and History of Science (30 papers), Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 papers) and Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 papers). Michael Strevens is often cited by papers focused on Philosophy and History of Science (30 papers), Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 papers) and Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 papers). Michael Strevens collaborates with scholars based in United States. Michael Strevens's co-authors include and has published in prestigious journals such as Cognition, The Journal of Philosophy and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

In The Last Decade

Michael Strevens

48 papers receiving 1.1k citations

Peers — A (Enhanced Table)

Peers by citation overlap · career bar shows stage (early→late) cites · hero ref

Name h Career Trend Papers Cites
Michael Strevens United States 18 696 399 235 184 162 50 1.2k
Peter Lipton United Kingdom 19 954 1.4× 675 1.7× 310 1.3× 273 1.5× 316 2.0× 46 2.1k
Peter Achinstein United States 20 830 1.2× 362 0.9× 265 1.1× 172 0.9× 172 1.1× 75 1.6k
Nancy Cartwright United States 12 525 0.8× 162 0.4× 151 0.6× 182 1.0× 166 1.0× 29 1.2k
Colin Howson United Kingdom 17 663 1.0× 401 1.0× 173 0.7× 81 0.4× 380 2.3× 67 1.3k
Gerhard Schurz Germany 20 663 1.0× 384 1.0× 232 1.0× 134 0.7× 558 3.4× 142 1.4k
Pierre Duhem United States 11 856 1.2× 321 0.8× 165 0.7× 235 1.3× 103 0.6× 38 1.7k
Peter Urbach United Kingdom 15 407 0.6× 217 0.5× 164 0.7× 96 0.5× 255 1.6× 34 1.2k
Stephen Mumford United Kingdom 23 729 1.0× 786 2.0× 876 3.7× 187 1.0× 122 0.8× 122 2.2k
Mauricio Suárez Spain 17 1.1k 1.5× 158 0.4× 121 0.5× 165 0.9× 113 0.7× 56 1.7k
Paul Humphreys United States 18 670 1.0× 183 0.5× 152 0.6× 239 1.3× 244 1.5× 52 1.4k

Countries citing papers authored by Michael Strevens

Since Specialization
Citations

This map shows the geographic impact of Michael Strevens's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Michael Strevens with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Michael Strevens more than expected).

Fields of papers citing papers by Michael Strevens

Since Specialization
Physical SciencesHealth SciencesLife SciencesSocial Sciences

This network shows the impact of papers produced by Michael Strevens. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Michael Strevens. The network helps show where Michael Strevens may publish in the future.

No nodes

All Works

20 of 20 papers shown
1.
Strevens, Michael. (2025). Grasp as a universal requirement for understanding. Philosophical Studies. 1 indexed citations
2.
Strevens, Michael. (2020). Permissible idealizations for the purpose of prediction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 85. 92–100. 2 indexed citations
3.
Strevens, Michael. (2019). Explanation, Abstraction, and Difference‐Making. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 99(3). 726–731. 2 indexed citations
4.
Strevens, Michael. (2019). Thinking Off Your Feet. Harvard University Press eBooks. 16 indexed citations
5.
6.
Strevens, Michael. (2018). The Whole Story. Oxford University Press eBooks. 1 indexed citations
7.
Strevens, Michael. (2017). The structure of asymptotic idealization. Synthese. 196(5). 1713–1731. 14 indexed citations
8.
Strevens, Michael. (2015). Complexity Theory. Oxford University Press eBooks.
9.
Strevens, Michael. (2013). No understanding without explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 44(3). 510–515. 168 indexed citations
10.
Strevens, Michael. (2013). Tychomancy. Harvard University Press eBooks. 17 indexed citations
11.
Strevens, Michael. (2012). Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo that Works. The Journal of Philosophy. 109(11). 652–675. 21 indexed citations
12.
Strevens, Michael. (2008). Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support. Philosopher's Imprint. 8(8). 9 indexed citations
13.
Strevens, Michael. (2008). Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 77(1). 171–192. 25 indexed citations
14.
Strevens, Michael. (2004). The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally. Noûs. 38(1). 154–176. 106 indexed citations
15.
Strevens, Michael. (2004). Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework?. Synthese. 141(3). 365–379. 12 indexed citations
16.
Strevens, Michael. (2003). Bigger than Chaos. Harvard University Press eBooks. 44 indexed citations
17.
Strevens, Michael. (2003). The Role of the Priority Rule in Science. The Journal of Philosophy. 100(2). 55–79. 194 indexed citations
19.
Strevens, Michael. (2001). The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 52(3). 515–537. 36 indexed citations
20.
Strevens, Michael. (2000). The essentialist aspect of naive theories. Cognition. 74(2). 149–175. 103 indexed citations

Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.

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