Michael Blome‐Tillmann

836 total citations
33 papers, 373 citations indexed

About

Michael Blome‐Tillmann is a scholar working on Philosophy, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology and Artificial Intelligence. According to data from OpenAlex, Michael Blome‐Tillmann has authored 33 papers receiving a total of 373 indexed citations (citations by other indexed papers that have themselves been cited), including 27 papers in Philosophy, 21 papers in Experimental and Cognitive Psychology and 8 papers in Artificial Intelligence. Recurrent topics in Michael Blome‐Tillmann's work include Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (27 papers), Philosophy and Theoretical Science (20 papers) and Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (8 papers). Michael Blome‐Tillmann is often cited by papers focused on Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (27 papers), Philosophy and Theoretical Science (20 papers) and Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (8 papers). Michael Blome‐Tillmann collaborates with scholars based in United Kingdom, Canada and United States. Michael Blome‐Tillmann's co-authors include and has published in prestigious journals such as SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and The Philosophical Quarterly.

In The Last Decade

Michael Blome‐Tillmann

32 papers receiving 333 citations

Peers — A (Enhanced Table)

Peers by citation overlap · career bar shows stage (early→late) cites · hero ref

Name h Career Trend Papers Cites
Michael Blome‐Tillmann United Kingdom 13 299 189 102 70 67 33 373
Levi Spectre Israel 7 233 0.8× 93 0.5× 105 1.0× 40 0.6× 52 0.8× 22 315
John Biro United States 10 207 0.7× 123 0.7× 50 0.5× 33 0.5× 88 1.3× 43 351
Mark Lance United States 13 238 0.8× 151 0.8× 103 1.0× 74 1.1× 63 0.9× 35 402
Clayton Littlejohn United Kingdom 15 710 2.4× 345 1.8× 360 3.5× 129 1.8× 89 1.3× 57 779
Stephen Hetherington Australia 11 416 1.4× 270 1.4× 144 1.4× 70 1.0× 104 1.6× 68 489
Jacob Ross United States 8 275 0.9× 109 0.6× 134 1.3× 54 0.8× 37 0.6× 25 353
Gunnar Björnsson Sweden 11 261 0.9× 78 0.4× 249 2.4× 41 0.6× 32 0.5× 33 414
Jon Robson United Kingdom 9 140 0.5× 90 0.5× 105 1.0× 55 0.8× 29 0.4× 24 263
Michael Williams United States 11 305 1.0× 151 0.8× 54 0.5× 52 0.7× 21 0.3× 36 385
Bede Rundle United Kingdom 10 164 0.5× 141 0.7× 82 0.8× 32 0.5× 29 0.4× 25 315

Countries citing papers authored by Michael Blome‐Tillmann

Since Specialization
Citations

This map shows the geographic impact of Michael Blome‐Tillmann's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Michael Blome‐Tillmann with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Michael Blome‐Tillmann more than expected).

Fields of papers citing papers by Michael Blome‐Tillmann

Since Specialization
Physical SciencesHealth SciencesLife SciencesSocial Sciences

This network shows the impact of papers produced by Michael Blome‐Tillmann. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Michael Blome‐Tillmann. The network helps show where Michael Blome‐Tillmann may publish in the future.

No nodes

All Works

20 of 20 papers shown
1.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2020). Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox. Mind. 129(514). 563–578. 10 indexed citations
2.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2019). What Shifts Epistemic Standards? DeRose on Contextualism, Safety, and Sensitivity. 10(1). 21–27. 2 indexed citations
3.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2017). 'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation). 13 indexed citations
4.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2016). Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism1. Cambridge University Press eBooks. 96–113. 1 indexed citations
5.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2015). Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law. Thought A Journal of Philosophy. 4(2). 102–112. 41 indexed citations
6.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2015). Sensitivity Actually. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 94(3). 606–625. 17 indexed citations
7.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2015). Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View. Mind. 124(496). 1221–1230. 1 indexed citations
8.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2014). Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford University Press eBooks. 38 indexed citations
9.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2014). Solving the Moorean Puzzle. Philosophical Studies. 172(2). 493–514. 3 indexed citations
10.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2013). Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them). Philosophy Compass. 8(2). 170–185. 38 indexed citations
11.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2013). Knowledge and implicatures. Synthese. 190(18). 4293–4319. 17 indexed citations
12.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2009). Non-Cognitivism and the Grammar of Morality. 1 indexed citations
13.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2009). Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators*. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 79(2). 315–331. 12 indexed citations
14.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2008). Contextualism, safety and epistemic relevance. Philosophical Studies. 143(3). 383–394. 5 indexed citations
15.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2008). Conversational implicature and the cancellability test. Analysis. 68(2). 156–160. 21 indexed citations
16.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2007). The folly of trying to define knowledge. Analysis. 67(295). 214–219. 5 indexed citations
17.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2006). A CLOSER LOOK AT CLOSURE SCEPTICISM. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 106(1). 383–392. 3 indexed citations
18.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2006). A CLOSER LOOK AT CLOSURE SCEPTICISM. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 106(3). 381–390. 2 indexed citations
19.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2006). The indexicality of ‘knowledge’. Philosophical Studies. 138(1). 29–53. 21 indexed citations
20.
Blome‐Tillmann, Michael. (2003). What's Wrong With Sceptical Invariantism?. 1 indexed citations

Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.

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