Ian Proops
Impact in
- Philosophy top 2%
- Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- War, Ethics, and Justification
- Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations
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- Philosophy, Science, and History
Papers in ⓘ
- Philosophy 20
- Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications 9
- Philosophical Ethics and Theory 7
- Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education 3
- War, Ethics, and Justification 2
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- Philosophy and Theoretical Science 9
Ian Proops
17 papers receiving 137 citations
Peers
Comparison fields: 5 of 26
- Philosophy 146
- History and Philosophy of Science 45
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology 93
- Theoretical Computer Science 6
- Cognitive Neuroscience 19
Countries citing papers authored by Ian Proops
This map shows the geographic impact of Ian Proops's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Ian Proops with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Ian Proops more than expected).
Fields of papers citing papers by Ian Proops
This network shows the impact of papers produced by Ian Proops. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Ian Proops. The network helps show where Ian Proops may publish in the future.
Co-authors
The 2 scholars most cited alongside Ian Proops, linked wherever they have co-authored with each other. Click a name or a connecting line to browse the papers they share.
All Works
Showing the 20 most-cited of 21 papers — load more, or switch the sort, to bring in the rest.
| # | Work | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2001 | 26 | |
| 2 | 2003 | 22 | |
| 3 | 2013 | 19 | |
| 4 | 2010 | 17 | |
| 5 | 2005 | 17 | |
| 6 | Kant on the cosmological argument | 2014 | 15 |
| 7 | 2004 | 8 | |
| 8 | 2021 | 8 | |
| 9 | 2014 | 8 | |
| 10 | 2011 | 7 | |
| 11 | 1997 | 6 | |
| 12 | 2006 | 5 | |
| 13 | 2007 | 4 | |
| 14 | 2006 | 4 | |
| 15 | 2002 | 3 | |
| 16 | 2023 | 2 | |
| 17 | 2001 | 1 | |
| 18 | 2023 | 0 | |
| 19 | 2020 | 0 | |
| 20 | 2017 | 0 |
About Ian Proops
Ian Proops is a scholar working on Philosophy, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Political Science and International Relations and Artificial Intelligence, having authored 21 papers that have together received 172 indexed citations. Recurring topics across this work include Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 papers), Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications (9 papers), Philosophical Ethics and Theory (7 papers), Philosophy, Science, and History (6 papers), Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (3 papers), Logic, programming, and type systems (2 papers), War, Ethics, and Justification (2 papers) and Philosophy and History of Science (2 papers). The work is most often cited by research in Philosophy (146 citations), History and Philosophy of Science (45 citations), Experimental and Cognitive Psychology (93 citations), Theoretical Computer Science (6 citations) and Cognitive Neuroscience (19 citations). Ian Proops has collaborated with scholars based in United States and United Kingdom. Frequent co-authors include Michael Kremer and Roy Sorensen. Their work appears in journals such as The Philosophical Review, Journal of the history of philosophy, Noûs, European Journal of Philosophy and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.