Ema Sullivan‐Bissett

467 total citations
30 papers, 204 citations indexed

About

Ema Sullivan‐Bissett is a scholar working on Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy and Sociology and Political Science. According to data from OpenAlex, Ema Sullivan‐Bissett has authored 30 papers receiving a total of 204 indexed citations (citations by other indexed papers that have themselves been cited), including 21 papers in Cognitive Neuroscience, 16 papers in Philosophy and 6 papers in Sociology and Political Science. Recurrent topics in Ema Sullivan‐Bissett's work include Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (17 papers), Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 papers) and Free Will and Agency (6 papers). Ema Sullivan‐Bissett is often cited by papers focused on Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (17 papers), Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 papers) and Free Will and Agency (6 papers). Ema Sullivan‐Bissett collaborates with scholars based in United Kingdom and Italy. Ema Sullivan‐Bissett's co-authors include Paul Noordhof, Lisa Bortolotti, Matthew R. Broome, Matteo Mameli and Michael Rush and has published in prestigious journals such as SHILAP Revista de lepidopterología, Consciousness and Cognition and Synthese.

In The Last Decade

Ema Sullivan‐Bissett

26 papers receiving 190 citations

Peers — A (Enhanced Table)

Peers by citation overlap · career bar shows stage (early→late) cites · hero ref

Name h Career Trend Papers Cites
Ema Sullivan‐Bissett United Kingdom 9 131 127 55 33 29 30 204
Sarah K. Paul United States 10 158 1.2× 201 1.6× 26 0.5× 78 2.4× 21 0.7× 21 320
Valerie San Juan Canada 9 128 1.0× 92 0.7× 50 0.9× 81 2.5× 46 1.6× 17 296
Gregg D. Caruso United States 12 315 2.4× 218 1.7× 66 1.2× 47 1.4× 37 1.3× 48 425
D. Justin Coates United States 9 266 2.0× 170 1.3× 47 0.9× 31 0.9× 36 1.2× 16 319
Jordan Taylor United States 6 93 0.7× 25 0.2× 58 1.1× 18 0.5× 32 1.1× 12 182
Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen Denmark 12 225 1.7× 336 2.6× 56 1.0× 131 4.0× 33 1.1× 38 406
Shane N. Glackin United Kingdom 9 58 0.4× 90 0.7× 24 0.4× 13 0.4× 12 0.4× 23 182
Donna E. West United States 9 36 0.3× 81 0.6× 21 0.4× 64 1.9× 31 1.1× 48 225
Luca Barlassina United Kingdom 7 147 1.1× 41 0.3× 14 0.3× 39 1.2× 76 2.6× 12 199
Kathryn Tabb United States 7 39 0.3× 65 0.5× 26 0.5× 35 1.1× 15 0.5× 24 172

Countries citing papers authored by Ema Sullivan‐Bissett

Since Specialization
Citations

This map shows the geographic impact of Ema Sullivan‐Bissett's research. It shows the number of citations coming from papers published by authors working in each country. You can also color the map by specialization and compare the number of citations received by Ema Sullivan‐Bissett with the expected number of citations based on a country's size and research output (numbers larger than one mean the country cites Ema Sullivan‐Bissett more than expected).

Fields of papers citing papers by Ema Sullivan‐Bissett

Since Specialization
Physical SciencesHealth SciencesLife SciencesSocial Sciences

This network shows the impact of papers produced by Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. Nodes represent research fields, and links connect fields that are likely to share authors. Colored nodes show fields that tend to cite the papers produced by Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. The network helps show where Ema Sullivan‐Bissett may publish in the future.

Co-authorship network of co-authors of Ema Sullivan‐Bissett

This figure shows the co-authorship network connecting the top 25 collaborators of Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. A scholar is included among the top collaborators of Ema Sullivan‐Bissett based on the total number of citations received by their joint publications. Widths of edges represent the number of papers authors have co-authored together. Node borders signify the number of papers an author published with Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. Ema Sullivan‐Bissett is excluded from the visualization to improve readability, since they are connected to all nodes in the network.

All Works

20 of 20 papers shown
1.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema, et al.. (2025). Reconceptualizing Delusion. University of Zagreb University Computing Centre (SRCE). 21(2). 155–180.
2.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2025). Irrationality. Cambridge University Press eBooks. 1 indexed citations
3.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema, et al.. (2024). Conspiracy Beliefs and Monothematic Delusions: A Case for De-pathologizing. Erkenntnis. 91(1). 285–310. 2 indexed citations
4.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema & Paul Noordhof. (2024). Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again. Neuroethics. 17(1).
5.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2024). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusion. 2 indexed citations
6.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2023). Virtually imagining our biases. Philosophical Psychology. 36(4). 860–893. 2 indexed citations
7.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2022). Believing badly ain’t so bad. Philosophical Psychology. 36(6). 1208–1216. 3 indexed citations
8.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2022). Against a second factor. University of Birmingham Research Portal (University of Birmingham). 1(1). 1 indexed citations
9.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema & Michael Rush. (2022). Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It’s Hard to Judge. The British Journal of Aesthetics. 63(2). 157–179.
10.
Noordhof, Paul & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. (2021). The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions. Synthese. 199(3-4). 10277–10309. 13 indexed citations
11.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema & Paul Noordhof. (2019). The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief. Philosophical Studies. 177(5). 1213–1227. 7 indexed citations
12.
Bortolotti, Lisa & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. (2019). Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?. Synthese. 198(6). 5437–5454. 8 indexed citations
13.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2018). Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience. Philosophical Psychology. 31(6). 920–947. 7 indexed citations
14.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2017). Aims and Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy. 25(3). 721–731. 4 indexed citations
15.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2017). Fictional Persuasion, Transparency, and the Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press eBooks. 4 indexed citations
16.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2017). Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?. Synthese. 195(8). 3453–3476. 12 indexed citations
17.
Bortolotti, Lisa & Ema Sullivan‐Bissett. (2017). How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?. Philosophical Explorations. 20(sup1). 1–3. 4 indexed citations
18.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema & Paul Noordhof. (2017). Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims. Logos & Episteme. 8(1). 147–153. 3 indexed citations
19.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2016). Malfunction defended. Synthese. 194(7). 2501–2522. 5 indexed citations
20.
Sullivan‐Bissett, Ema. (2014). Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence. Consciousness and Cognition. 33. 548–560. 39 indexed citations

Rankless uses publication and citation data sourced from OpenAlex, an open and comprehensive bibliographic database. While OpenAlex provides broad and valuable coverage of the global research landscape, it—like all bibliographic datasets—has inherent limitations. These include incomplete records, variations in author disambiguation, differences in journal indexing, and delays in data updates. As a result, some metrics and network relationships displayed in Rankless may not fully capture the entirety of a scholar's output or impact.

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