Standout Papers

A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules 1985 2026 1998 2012 295
  1. A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules (1998)
    Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
  2. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining (1985)
    Alvin E. Roth, Alvin E. Roth et al. Cambridge University Press eBooks
  3. Using auctions to divest generation assets (1997)
    Peter Cramton, Robert Wilson et al. The Electricity Journal
  4. Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed (2020)
    Peter Cramton, Axel Ockenfels et al. Nature

Citation Impact

Citing Papers

Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
2018 Standout
Bargaining with Private Information
1991 StandoutNobel
Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria
1998 StandoutNobel
Can Strategic Bargaining Models Explain Collective Bargaining Data
2016 StandoutNobel
Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data
2001 Standout
CHEAP TALK WITH TWO AUDIENCES
1989
Strikes and Bargaining: A Survey of the Recent Empirical Literature
2007 StandoutNobel
Evolution of indirect reciprocity
2005 StandoutNature
The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match
2003 StandoutNobel
Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
2025
Bargaining with common values
1989
Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm
2004
Theories of Bargaining Delays
1990 StandoutScienceNobel
Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-in-Differences Models
2006 StandoutNobel
Matching with Contracts
2005 StandoutNobel
The Limited Influence of Unemployment on the Wage Bargain
2008 StandoutNobel
Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities
2003
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
1999
Risk aversion and bargaining ∗
1987 StandoutNobel
Hedging Winner's Curse with Multiple Bids: Evidence from the Portuguese Treasury Bill Auction
1999
Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
2013
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
2002 StandoutNobel
Experts and Amateurs: The Role of Experience in Internet Auctions
2000
Efficient Mechanism Design
1997
Repeated contract negotiations with private information
1995
The second theorem of the second best
1994
Asymmetric equilibria in the war of attrition
1985
Holdouts and wage bargaining in The Netherlands
1996
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
2017
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
2002 StandoutNobel
Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements
1991
Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions
2000
Volatile Policy and Private Information: The Case of Monetary Shocks
2001
Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining
2004
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
2012 StandoutNobel
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
2017 StandoutNobel
Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
2012
The Boston Public School Match
2005 StandoutNobel
Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
2007 StandoutNobel
Efficient Auctions
2000 StandoutNobel
WAGE BARGAINING, HOLDOUT, AND INFLATION
1997
The rise and fall of the sliding scale, or why wages are no longer indexed to product prices
2009
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
1998
Optimal Auction with Resale
2002
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2002 StandoutNobel
Kidney Exchange
2004 StandoutNobel
On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty
1988
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
2005 StandoutNobel
Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data
1989 StandoutNobel
Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
1986 StandoutNobel
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
2008 StandoutNobel
Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group
2007 StandoutNobel
Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters And Pilots
2011 StandoutNobel
The CMS Auction: Experimental Studies of a Median-Bid Procurement Auction with Nonbinding Bids
2012
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
2002 StandoutNobel
COURSE BIDDING AT BUSINESS SCHOOLS*
2010
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
1999 StandoutNobel
How Market Design Emerged from Game Theory: A Mutual Interview
2019 StandoutNobel
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
1999
Two-sided markets: a progress report
2006 StandoutNobel
Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence
1988 Standout
Assignment Messages and Exchanges
2009 StandoutNobel
Interface Between Engineering and Market Operations in Restructured Electricity Systems
2005 StandoutNobel
An “evolutionary” interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
1991
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
2003
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
2005 StandoutNobel
Integration scenarios of Demand Response into electricity markets: Load shifting, financial savings and policy implications
2016
Game theory and the spectrum auctions
1998 StandoutNobel
The New York City High School Match
2005 StandoutNobel
Contracts as Reference Points*
2008 StandoutNobel
A Theory of Misgovernance
1997 StandoutNobel
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
2000 StandoutNobel
A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
1989
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
2007 StandoutNobel
A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
1999
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
1996
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
2013 StandoutNobel
The Economist as Plumber
2017 StandoutNobel
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
2006 StandoutNobel
Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation
2004
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
1999 StandoutNobel
The Nash equilibrium: A perspective
2004 StandoutNobel
Evolution and Intelligent Design
2008 StandoutNobel
Putting Auction Theory to Work
2004 StandoutNobel
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
1990
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
2016 StandoutScience
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
2000 StandoutNobel
Managing Online Auctions: Current Business and Research Issues
2003
Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
2012 StandoutNobel

Works of Peter Cramton being referenced

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
1985 StandoutNobel
STRIKES AND HOLDOUTS IN WAGE BARGAINING: THEORY AND DATA
1998
Bargaining with a Shared Interest: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes
2010
The role of time and information in bargaining
1984
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
1997
Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition
1996
Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
1987
Wage Bargining with Time-Varying Threats
1994
The Efficiency of the Fcc Spectrum Auctions
1998
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
1997
Unions, Bargaining and Strikes
2003
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
2014
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
1997
Economics and Design of Capacity Markets for the Power Sector
2012
Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
1988
A Capacity Market that Makes Sense
2005
Money Out of Thin Air: The nationwide Narrowband pcs Auction
1995
The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
2015
Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design
2010
Ascending auctions
1998
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
1997
Using auctions to divest generation assets
1997 StandoutNobel
Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
1990
The Optimality of Being Efficient: Designing Auctions
1998
No Substitute for the "P" Word in Financial Rescue
2009
Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
2004
DESIGNED TO FAIL: THE MEDICARE AUCTION FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
2014
Rankless by CCL
2026