Standout Papers
- An Economic Theory of Alliances (1966)
- The Logic of Collective Action (1965)
- Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development (1993)
- Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (1990)
- The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. (1966)
- The Rise and Decline of Nations. (1983)
- The Logic of Collective Action. (1966)
Citation Impact
Citing Papers
Geography and macroeconomics: New data and new findings
2006 StandoutNobel
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
1986
The Drama of the Commons
2002 StandoutNobel
The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations
2007
Punctuated Equilibria and Technological Progress
1990 StandoutNobel
Leapfrogging in international competition: A theory of cycles in national technological leadership
1993 StandoutNobel
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
1990 Standout
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups
1988
Testing Hypotheses for the Success of Different Conservation Strategies
2006
Diet rapidly and reproducibly alters the human gut microbiome
2013 StandoutNature
Hunting income patterns among the Hadza: big game, common goods, foraging goals and the evolution of the human diet
1991
The Struggle to Govern the Commons
2003 StandoutScienceNobel
A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective
2004 StandoutNobel
Union Organization in Advanced Industrial Democracies
1989
Endogenous Provision and Appropriation in the Commons
1998
Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches
1995 Standout
Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia
2002 StandoutNobel
Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed
1998 StandoutNobel
International Variation in the Business-Government Interface: Institutional and Organizational Considerations
1995
Unbundling Institutions
2005 StandoutNobel
Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective
1977
The tenacious past: Theories of personal and collective conservatism
1988
Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation
1986 Standout
Explaining discussion-induced cooperation.
1988
Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe
1998
Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions
2006
Insights on linking forests, trees, and people from the air, on the ground, and in the laboratory
2006 StandoutNobel
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
1995
Institutions and growth in limited access societies
2010
Going beyond panaceas
2007 StandoutNobel
"If You Don't Do it, Nobody Else Will": Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action
1984
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
1983 StandoutNobel
The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited
1998 StandoutNobel
CORPORATE POLITICAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN COMPETITION: THE CASE OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY.
1996
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
1986
Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation
1997 Standout
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
1986
Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital
1995 Standout
Economic inequality and burden-sharing in the provision of local environmental quality
2002
Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges
1999 StandoutScienceNobel
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
1992 StandoutNobel
The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution
2011 StandoutNobel
Reformulating the commons
2002 StandoutNobel
Social Structure and Development: A Legacy of the Holocaust in Russia
2011 StandoutNobel
The quality of government
1999 Standout
Realizing the potential of digital development: The case of agricultural advice
2019 StandoutScienceNobel
Corporate Social Responsibility: An Assessment of the Enlightened Self-Interest Model
1978
On the private provision of public goods
1986
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. I. Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem
1979
Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions
1998 StandoutNobel
In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action
2004 StandoutNobel
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
2003 Standout
Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of Stagnation and Growth
1996
An Institutional Model of Organizational Practice: Financial Reporting at the Fortune 200
1990
Fools Rush in? The Institutional Context of Industry Creation
1994
Market failure, government failure, and the private supply of public goods: The case of climate-controlled walkway networks
1999
A Grammar of Institutions
1995 StandoutNobel
Structural resolutions of collective action problems
1974
INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
1995 Standout
When Do Rules of Procedure Matter?
1984
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox
2001
Alternative Choices in Social Dilemmas
1982
The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey
2000 StandoutNobel
“Does My Contribution Really Matter?”: Efficacy in Social Dilemmas
1996
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: APPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2002
Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis
1984
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods. II. Provision Points, Stakes, Experience, and the Free-Rider Problem
1980
Politicians and Firms
1994 Standout
The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists
1981
Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management
2004 StandoutNobel
The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right
2001
The Evolution of Cooperation
1981 StandoutScience
Religion, Context, and Constraint toward Strangers
1992
Democracy as a middle ground: A unified theory of development and political regimes
2013
Knowledge systems for sustainable development
2003 Standout
Corporate Social Performance Revisited
1991 Standout
Domain Maintenance as an Objective of Business Political Activity: An Expanded Typology
1984
On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Electoral Process
1985
Institutional Failure in Resource Management
2006
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
2000 StandoutNobel
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
2004 StandoutNobel
Technological Inertia in Economic History
1992 StandoutNobel
A Thousand Years of Trade History: What's Left Out?
2010
The impact of inequality, gender, external assistance and social capital on local-level cooperation
1998
Threshold Models of Collective Behavior
1978 Standout
Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation
1990
Interorganizational Relations
1985
Toward a Theory of Bargaining: An Experimental Study in Economics
1983 StandoutScienceNobel
WHY DON'T POOR COUNTRIES CATCH UP? A CROSS‐NATIONAL TEST OF AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
1997
Determinants of PAC Participation Among Large Corporations
1985
Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions
1999 Standout
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
1981 Standout
Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa
2013
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
2008 StandoutNobel
Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory
1977 Standout
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS‐COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
1995 Standout
Cooperation by Design: Leadership, Structure, and Collective Dilemmas
1990
Beyond the Washington consensus
1998
Economists free ride, does anyone else?
1981
Local Enforcement and Better Forests
2004 StandoutNobel
Civic Norms, Social Sanctions, and Voter Turnout
1992
On the Rise and Decline of Nations
1983
The Limits of Financial Globalization
2005 Standout
The Paradox of Interdependent Relations in the Field of Social Issues in Management
1989
Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?
2004
Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations
1980
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?
1999 Standout
Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies
2008 StandoutNobel
Markets and jungles
2011
Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive
1996 Standout
Political Order and One-Party Rule
2010
Punishment in Iterated Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games
1990
The new social movements: A theoretical approach
1980
The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead
2000 StandoutNobel
Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab
2003
How Institutions Evolve
2004 Standout
On the role of social norms in a market economy
1985
Financial Reporting Incentives for Conservative Accounting: The Influence of Legal and Political Institutions
2005
Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002
2003 Standout
Design principles in long-enduring institutions of Japanese irrigation common-pool resources
2001
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
1986 Standout
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
2003 StandoutNobel
CALCULATING TRAGEDY: ASSESSING THE COSTS OF TERRORISM
2007
The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems
1983
Guilds, efficiency, and social capital: evidence from German proto‐industry
2004
A Theory of Misgovernance
1997 StandoutNobel
Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System
1988
Epistemic choice and public choice
1993
Twenty-five Years with The Logic of Collective Action
1993
A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems
2009 StandoutScienceNobel
Corporate Political Strategy and Legislative Decision Making: A Review and Contingency Approach
1986
Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources
2001
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth
2004
Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansisons of Resource Mobilization Theory
1984
The strategic uses of regulation — And deregulation
1981
Uncertainty in forecasts of long-run economic growth
2018 StandoutNobel
Education, corruption, and the distribution of income
2009
Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis
1981 Standout
Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress
1994 StandoutNobel
Cooperative and Noncooperative Behavior in Animals
1980
HUMAN ECOLOGY AND RESOURCE SUSTAINABILITY: The Importance of Institutional Diversity
1995 StandoutNobel
Institutions, Factor Prices, and Taxation: Virtues of Strong States?
2010 StandoutNobel
Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan*
2012
The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country
2003 Standout
Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners' dilemma
1971
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
1990 StandoutNobel
Predisposition and Behaviour in a Collective Dilemma
1977
Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
2006 StandoutNobel
The Critical Mass in Collective Action.
1994
Governance Structures and Resource Policy Reform: Insights from Agricultural Transition
2009
Success on the Commons
1992
Social conflict and growth
1996
The effects of industry concentration and regulation on contributions in three 1972 U. S. senate campaigns
1976
Free Riders and Zealots: The Role of Social Networks
1988
Organized Business Politics in Democratic Brazil
1998
Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry
2009
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
2005
Pollution and Property
2002
A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas
2007 StandoutNobel
Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter?
2000 StandoutNobel
Reward structures and the allocation of talent
1995 StandoutNobel
Corporate political strategies and firm performance: indications of firm-specific benefits from personal service in the U.S. government
1999
Law, Politics, and Finance
2009
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
1996
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
2006 Standout
Motivational bases of the public goods problem.
1986
Social Movement Involvement in the Wake of a Nuclear Accident: Activists and Free Riders in the TMI Area
1983
Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
1976
Promoting Transparency in Social Science Research
2014 StandoutScienceNobel
Political instability and economic growth
1996
Works of Mancur Olson being referenced
The Swedish Experiment
1997
The Marginal Utility of Income Does Not Increase: Borrowing, Lending, and Friedman-Savage Gambles
2016 Nobel
The Logic of Collective Action
2009
Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?
1992
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
1969
Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force
1963
Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance
1999
An Economic Theory of Alliances
1966 Standout
Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies
1996
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy
1990 StandoutNobel
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
1983
The Logic of Collective Action
1965 Standout
The Rise and Decline of Nations.
1983 Standout
Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships
2000
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development
1993 Standout
The Rise and Decline of Nations
1983
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
1983
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
1973
Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?
2000
Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor
1996
The Logic of Collective Action.
1966 Standout
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
1982
The Rise and Decline of Nations
2017
The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.
1984
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
1966 Standout