Citation Impact
Citing Papers
Informational Asymmetries, Strategic Behavior, and Industrial Organization
2016 StandoutNobel
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
2000
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-party System with Rational Voters
1988
The Limits of ex post Implementation
2006
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
2005 StandoutNature
AOA Symposium
2008 StandoutNobel
The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match
2003 StandoutNobel
Clock Auctions and Radio Spectrum Reallocation
2019 StandoutNobel
Matching with Contracts
2005 StandoutNobel
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
1994 Standout
Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation
2009 StandoutNobel
Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
1977 StandoutNobel
The Los Angeles Riot and the Economics of Urban Unrest
1998
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
1998
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
2002
Population uncertainty and Poisson games
1998 StandoutNobel
A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
2000
Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
2004
Rational Choice in Experimental Markets
1986
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
2003
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
2002 StandoutNobel
Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions
1997
Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
2010 StandoutNobel
Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation
2014
Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation
2017 StandoutNobel
The Boston Public School Match
2005 StandoutNobel
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
2004 StandoutNobel
Experiments With the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods
2000
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
2006 StandoutNobel
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
1987
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
2012 StandoutNobel
Theory and Evidence on the Role of Social Norms in Voting
2005
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
1988
Political Economy of Mechanisms
2008 StandoutNobel
The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design
1996
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
2002 StandoutNobel
Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction
1997
Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
1987
Borrow crisis tactics to get COVID-19 supplies to where they are needed
2020 StandoutNatureNobel
Kidney Exchange
2004 StandoutNobel
Up in the Air: GTE's Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses
1997
The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation
2017 StandoutNobel
Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs
2013
Endogenous Political Institutions
2004 StandoutNobel
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
2005 StandoutNobel
A Simple Model of Herd Behavior
1992 StandoutNobel
Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction
2008
Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis
2014 StandoutNobel
A binary conflict ascending price (BICAP) mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks
1996
On the impact of package selection in combinatorial auctions: an experimental study in the context of spectrum auction design
2012
Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group
2007 StandoutNobel
Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Reevaluating De Tocqueville*
2017 StandoutNobel
Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India
2004 StandoutNobel
Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions
2008 StandoutNobel
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
2002 StandoutNobel
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
2000 StandoutNobel
Democracy Does Cause Growth
2018 StandoutNobel
Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities*
2008 StandoutNobel
Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?
2004
Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships
1994 Standout
Large Poisson Games
2000 StandoutNobel
Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model
2014 StandoutNobel
A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs
1996
Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
1999
Package Auctions and Exchanges
2007 StandoutNobel
Markets as beneficial constraints on the government
2005
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
2005 StandoutNobel
The Real Swing Voter's Curse
2009 StandoutNobel
Selling Spectrum Rights
1994
Prediction Markets – A literature review 2014
2014
The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment
1997
The New York City High School Match
2005 StandoutNobel
A Simple Model of Voice
2001 StandoutNobel
Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice
2007 StandoutNobel
The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection
2011
Combinatorial auction design
2003
A crash course in implementation theory
2001
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
2007 StandoutNobel
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
1996
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
2017
The Economist as Plumber
2017 StandoutNobel
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
2006 StandoutNobel
CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE PRACTICE OF MARKET DESIGN
2010 StandoutNobel
Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms
2020
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
1999 StandoutNobel
Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay*
2012 StandoutNobel
The Nash equilibrium: A perspective
2004 StandoutNobel
Auction design with costly preference elicitation
2005
Putting Auction Theory to Work
2004 StandoutNobel
Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics
2016 StandoutScience
Asymmetric information and the electoral momentum of public opinion polls
1991
Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment
2007
Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction
2000 StandoutNobel
Strategic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making
1992
Works of John O. Ledyard being referenced
Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
1994
Some limitations of demand revelaing processes
1977
Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxes with No Commitment
2013
Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem
2000
A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority
2000
Information Aggregation in Two-Candidate Elections
1988
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
2005
Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
1994
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms
1997
Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach
1989
Scaling Up Learning Models in Public Good Games
2004
A market-based mechanism for allocating space Shuttle secondary payload priority
2000
Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms
1997
Using computerized exchange systems to solve an allocation problem in project management
1994
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
1986
An experimental test of combinatorial information markets
2008
The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services
2002
Repeated Implementation
1998
Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
1978
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
2010
Nonvoting and the existence of equilibrium under majority rule
1972
The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing
1993
Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders
2010
The allocation of a shared resource within an organization
1996
Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism
2012
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections
1984