Citation Impact
Citing Papers
Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria
1998 StandoutNobel
An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games
1992
Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption
1996
Biological signals as handicaps
1990 Standout
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
2005 StandoutNature
Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets *
2011 StandoutNobel
Beliefs, Doubts and Learning: Valuing Macroeconomic Risk
2007 StandoutNobel
Why Inflation Rose and Fell: Policy-Makers' Beliefs and U. S. Postwar Stabilization Policy*
2006
LEARNING DYNAMICS AND ENDOGENOUS CURRENCY CRISES
2008
Microeconomic Origins of Macroeconomic Tail Risks
2016 StandoutNobel
Theories of Bargaining Delays
1990 StandoutScienceNobel
Advances in Behavioral Finance.
1995 StandoutNobel
Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
2011
A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information
1992
A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
1999
Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
1992
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
1992
A Survey of Corporate Governance
1997 Standout
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
1994 Standout
Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Agency Costs and Dynamic Trading
1997
Security Analysis and Trading Patterns When Some Investors Receive Information Before Others
1994
Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
1989
Corporate Ownership Around the World
1999 Standout
Seniority and maturity of debt contracts
1993 StandoutNobel
Evolving PostWorld War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics
2001 StandoutNobel
Career development and specific human capital collection
1992
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
1990
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
2012 StandoutNobel
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
2004 StandoutNobel
Willpower and Personal Rules
2004 StandoutNobel
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
2006 StandoutNobel
The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment
2003 StandoutNobel
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
2012 StandoutNobel
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
1988
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling
1992
LAPM: A Liquidity‐Based Asset Pricing Model
2001 StandoutNobel
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
2000 StandoutNobel
Human Capital vs. Signalling Explanations of Wages
1995
Drifts and volatilities: monetary policies and outcomes in the post WWII US
2005 StandoutNobel
A Theory of Conformity
1994
The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage
1998 Standout
Strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data
1989 StandoutNobel
Escape Dynamics in Learning Models
2018
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
1987
Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt
1991 StandoutNobel
Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
1998 StandoutNobel
Public Policy in a Model of Long-term Unemployment
1995 StandoutNobel
Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual- and Common-Agency Perspective
2003 StandoutNobel
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
1989 StandoutNobel
On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
1990
An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"
2005
Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
1989 StandoutNobel
Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
1998 StandoutNobel
Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues
1989
The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings
1989 StandoutNobel
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research
1998 StandoutScience
Cichlid Fish Diversity Threatened by Eutrophication That Curbs Sexual Selection
1997 StandoutScience
Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
1989
Cognition and Incomplete Contracts
2009 StandoutNobel
Asymmetric Information and News Disclosure Rules
2000
Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control
1998 StandoutNobel
Computing Simply Stable Equilibria
1992 StandoutNobel
The Economics of Governance
2005 StandoutNobel
Liquidity, pledgeability, and the nature of lending
2021 StandoutNobel
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
2001
Memory and Anticipation
2005
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics
2000 StandoutNobel
A Theory of Debt Maturity: The Long and Short of Debt Overhang
2013 StandoutNobel
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory
2008
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
2003 StandoutNobel
Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game
1997
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
1992 StandoutNobel
Game Theory and The Law
2002
Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
1990
Layoffs and Lemons
1991
Pledgeability, Industry Liquidity, and Financing Cycles
2019 StandoutNobel
Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation
2006 StandoutNobel
Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk
1991 StandoutNobel
Reputation and corporate strategy: A review of recent theory and applications
1988
Evolution and Intelligent Design
2008 StandoutNobel
Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
1989
Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly
2004 StandoutNobel
Social Distance and Social Decisions
1997 StandoutNobel
Addiction to Rewards
2013
Model uncertainty and endogenous volatility
2007
Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII U.S.
2003 StandoutNobel
Works of In‐Koo Cho being referenced
A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
1987
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
1987 Standout
Escaping Nash Inflation
2000 StandoutNobel
Learning and Model Validation
2014
Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
1990
Escapist policy rules
2005