Fabian Herweg

REFERENCE POINTS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND FAIRNESS IN CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS

More is Less: Why Parties May Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts

Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market

HOW DO INFORMAL AGREEMENTS AND REVISION SHAPE CONTRACTUAL REFERENCE POINTS?

Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points

Expectations as Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation Experiments *

Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know?

Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics

UNCERTAIN DEMAND, CONSUMER LOSS AVERSION, AND FLAT-RATE TARIFFS

Loss Aversion and Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation

Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation